Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1985

Matthew Fenn Hilton v. Marvin D. Borthick : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Steven J. Sorenson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Respondents.
Charles W. Hanna; Kesler and Rust; Clarence J. Frost; Richardo Ferrari; Watkiss and Cambell;
Robert J. DeBry; Attorney for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hilton v. Borthick, No. 198520040.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/491

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

i^opoHO
•*TN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MATTHEW FENN HILTON, et al.,
Plaintiffs/
Appellants,
Case No. 20040
v.
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et al. ,
Defendants/
Respondents.
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

CHARLES W. HANNA
KESLER & RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-9333

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
STEVEN J. SORENSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

ROBERT J. DeBRY
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
RICARDO B. FERRARI
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-3300
CLARENCE J. FROST
3536 Market Street, No. 7
Granger, Utah 84119
Telephone: (801) 696-9225
Attorneys for Appellants

,IAN3H^b
Cterk. Supremo

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MATTHEW FENN HILTON, et al.,
Plaintiffs/
Appellants,
Case No. 20040
v.
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et al. ,
Defendants/
Respondents.
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

CHARLES W. HANNA
KESLER & RUST
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-9333
ROBERT J. DeBRY
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
RICARDO B. FERRARI
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-3300
CLARENCE J. FROST
3536 Market Street, No. 7
Granger, Utah 84119
Telephone: (801) 696-9225
Attorneys for Appellants

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
STEVEN J. SORENSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARGUMENT
POINT I

AN EXAMINATION OF THE APPLICATION
AND RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE
COMMON LAW IMMUNITY FOR
"DISCRETIONARY" FUNCTIONS
DEMONSTRATES THAT THE DISCRETIONARY WAIVER TO GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY SHOULD BE CONFINED
TO THOSE BASIC DECISIONS AND
ACTS OCCURRING AT THE "BASIC
POLICY MAKING LEVEL AND NOT
EXTENDED TO THOSE ACTS AND
DECISIONS TAKING PLACE AT THE
OPERATIONAL LEVEL."

POINT II

THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
AS DEFINED BY THIS COURT
LIMITS GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY TO THOSE DECISIONS
AND ACTS OCCURRING AT
THE BASIC POLICY MAKING
LEVEL
The omission of the commissioner
of the Department of Financial
Institutions did not require the
exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment or expertise
B,

POINT III

POINT IV

6

The commissioner of the Department
of Financial Institutions was not
statutorily authorized to violate
the law
9

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT
EXPAND THE DOCTRINE OF
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY .

10

HOLDING THE STATE LIABLE
FOR ITS NEGLIGENCE AND
THAT OF ITS AGENTS WILL
NOT MAKE THE STATE AN
INSURER OF ALL DEPOSITS
IN FINANCIAL INSTUTIONS
IN THAT STATE

12

-i-

POINT V

POINT VI

THE FEDERAL CASES CITED
BY RESPONDENTS, IN THEIR
BRIEF, DO NOT SUPPORT
THEIR CLAIM THAT THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE
IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN THE
CASE AT BAR

13

APPELLANTS SHOULD BE
ENTITLED TO A TRIAL TO
DETERMINE THE FACTS IN
THIS CASE

18

CONCLUSION

19
STATUTES CITED

United States Code Annotated
Title 28, Section 2680(a)

17

Utah Code Annotated (1953)
Section 7-3-3
Section 7-1-8

3, 9
3, 6, 7
CASES CITED

Andress v. State, 541 P.2d 117 (Utah 1975)

11

Carroll v. State Road Commission, 27 Utah
2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972)

4, 5

Dalehite v. United States, 364 U.S. 15
(1953)

10, 11

Dannhausen v. First National Bank of
Sturgeon Bay, 538 F. Supp. 551 (1982)

17

Davis v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., 369 F. Supp 277 (1974)

15, 16

Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523
(7th Cir. 1980)

14, 17

First Savings and Loan Association v.
First Federal Savings and Loan
Association, 531 F. Supp. 251 (1961)

15

-ii-

First Savings and Loan Association v.
First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Hawaii
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980)

15
5

Gormley v. State, 54 Ga. App. 843, 189 S.E.
288 (1936)

7, 8

Huntington Towers Ltd. v. Franklin
National Bank, 559 F.2d 863 (1977)

16,

In re Franklin National Bank Securities
Litigation, 445 F. Supp. 723
(E.D.N.Y. 1978)

14

Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782,
447 P.2d 352 (1968)

2

Little v. Utah State Division of Family
Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983)

1,5

Magellsen v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1031 (1972)
Morrison v. Salt Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d
553 (1979)
Owen v. The City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 648 (1979)

15
5
1, 2
11

State ex rel. Funk v. Turner, et al.,
42 S.W. 2d 594 (Mo. 1931)

6, 7

State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County,
123 Ariz. 324, 599 P.2d 777 (1979)

13

Teherepnin v. Franz, 570 F.2d 187 (7th
Cir. 1978)

13

United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S.
, 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984)

10

Vickers v. Motte, 109 Ga. App. 615, 137 S.E.
2d 77 (1964)

BO.HI
-iii-

8

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MATTHEW FENN HILTON, et al.,
Plaintiffs/
Appellants,
Case No- 20040
v.
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et al. ,
Defendants/
Respondents.
APPELLANTS1 REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN EXAMINATION OF THE APPLICATION AND RATIONALE UNDERLYING
THE COMMON LAW IMMUNITY FOR "DISCRETIONARY" FUNCTIONS DEMONSTRATES
THAT THE DISCRETIONARY WAIVER TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY SHOULD BE
CONFINED TO THOSE BASIC DECISIONS AND ACTS OCCURRING AT THE
"BASIC POLICY MAKING LEVEL AND NOT EXTENDED TO THOSE ACTS AND
DECISIONS TAKING PLACE AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL."
The discretionary function exception to the waiver of
governmental immunity is based upon the principle of separation
of powers rather than the rule of sovereign immunity.

For this

reason, it must be limited to actions where a coordinate branch
of government is engaged in making basic policy decisions.
This court recognized in Little v. Utah State Division
of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), that:
Where the responsibility for basic decisions has
been committed to one of the branches of our
tri-partite system of government, the courts have
refrained from sitting in judgment of the propriety
of those decisions.
The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Owen
v. The City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 648 (1979), noted

that the common law doctrine protecting the state from
"discretionary decisions—was not grounded on the principle of
sovereign immunity but on a concern for separation of powers."
(Id., at 648)
The Supreme Court in Owen further noted that for a
court or jury in a tort suit to review the reasonableness of a
municipality's judgment on matters of policy would "be an
infringement upon the powers properly vested in a coordinate and
co-equal branch of government."

The U.S. Supreme Court cited

the case of Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352 (1968),
wherein that court stated "immunity for discretionary activities
serves no purpose except to assure that courts refuse to pass
judgment on policy decision in the providence of coordinate
branches of government."

The discretionary function exception

to the waiver of governmental immunity must therefore be limited
to those occasions when a coordinate branch of government is
acting in its legislative or basic policy making levels.
Finally, in Owen, the United States Supreme Court
noted that many, if not all, of a municipality's activities
would seem to involve at least some measure of discretion, but
the courts in the United States had carved out an exception so
that, while a municipality retained its immunity for decisions as
to whether the public interest required acting in one manner or
another, once any particular decision was made, the city was
fully liable for any injuries incurred in the execution of its
judgment.
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An understanding of the rationale underlying the common
law immunity for discretionary functions explains why that doctrine
cannot serve as a foundation for governmental immunity in the
case at bar.

In their complaint, the appellants basically claim

that the respondents breached their duty to the appellant class
when the respondents failed to make certain statutorily required
inspections of Grove Finance Company.

The Utah Department of

Financial Institutions is part of the executive branch of government
in the State of Utah.

The Utah State Legislature, and not the

Department of Financial Institutions, in §7-3-3 U.C.A., determined
which financial institutions came under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Financial Institutions.

The legislature, in §7-1-8

U.C.A., set the policy requiring the Commissioner of the Department
of Financial Institutions to examine certain financial institutions
at least once a year.

The same statute set forth in great detail

exactly which institutions were to be examined and the manner
and extent of the examination.

Section 7-1-8, Utah Code

Ann, provides as follows:
The bank commissioner, or an examiner, shall
visit and examine every bank, savings bank, every
loan and trust corporation, every building and
loan association, every industrial loan company,
every small loan business, every cooperative
bank, at least once a year. At every such
examination, careful inquiry shall be made as to
the condition and resources of each institution
examined, the mode of conducting and managing its
affairs, the official actions of its directors
and officers, the investment and disposition of
its funds, the security afforded its members, if
any, and to those by whom its engagement are
held, whether or not it is violating any provisions
of law regarding to corporations or to the business
of the institution examined, whether or not it is
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complying with its articles of incorporation and
bylaws, and as to such other matters as the
commissioner may prescribe•
The respondents have claimed that this statute does
not apply to Grove Finance Company.

(Respondents' Brief, pp. 35-43)

In its memorandum decision in this case, the Third District
Court refused to rule what statutory standard applied in this case
(R. 963) and that matter is not before the court in this appeal.
The appellants, however, have alleged in their complaints that
this statute does apply and this court should accept that as the
fact in determining whether the state is immune from suit pursuant
to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
It is clear, however, that it is totally proper for the
courts to determine whether or not agents of the executive branch
have complied with statutory requirements placed upon them by
the legislature.
POINT II
THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION AS DEFINED BY THIS COURT
LIMITS GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY TO THOSE DECISIONS AND ACTS OCCURRING
AT THE BASIC POLICY MAKING LEVEL.
In their brief, the respondents decry the "blanket
test that discretionary immunity only applies to basic policy
making decisions" (Respondent's Brief, p. 2 3 ) . The fact of
the matter, however, is that this is precisely the standard
which has been established by this court.
In Carroll v. State Road Commission, this court recognized
that almost all acts require some degree of discretion, and
observed that "the exception to the waiver set forth in the
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Governmental Immunity Act should be confined to those decisions
and acts occurring at the basic policy making level and not
extended to those acts and decisions taking place at the operational
level."

Carroll v. State Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496

P.2d 888 (1972), Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
In Morrison v. Salt Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d 553
(1979), this court stated:
A discretionary function has been defined by this
court as one that requires a basic policy decision
essential to the realization or accomplishment of
some basic governmental policy, program or
objective. Any decision which does not require
the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment,
and expertise is not discretionary but operational
and is not protected.
Most recently, in Little v. State of Utah Division of
Family Services, this court set forth a four-part test in determining whether an act or omission could be considered discretionary
for the purposes of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Under

this test:
To be purely discretionary, an act by the state must
be affirmed under four preliminary questions:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or
decision necessarily involve a basic governmental
policy, program or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or
decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program or objective as
opposed to one which would not change the course
or direction of the policy, program or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission or decision
require the exercise of basic policy evaluation,
judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency involved?
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(4) Does the governmental agency involved
possess the requisite constitutional, statutory,
or lawful authority and duty to do or make the
challenged act, omission, or decision?
The appellants allege that the omissions of the
Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions complained
of in appellants' complaints fails tests 3 and 4 listed above.
A. THE OMMISSION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DID NOT REQUIRE THE EXERCISE OF BASIC
POLICY EVALUATION, JUDGMENT OR EXPERTISE.
In their complaints, the appellants allege that the
Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions and his
agents failed to inspect Grove Finance Company as required by
§7-1-8.

As previously noted above, the basic policy evaluation

and judgment was exercised by the state legislature in setting
forth the specific institutions to be examined, requiring the
commissioner to perform an annual examination, and in setting
forth in detail the mode and manner of all examinations.

A

failure to perform this required examination cannot be held to
require the exercise of basic policy evaluation.
This exact issue was determined by the Missouri Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Funk v. Turner, et al., 42 S.W. 2d 594
(Mo. 1931), where the Missouri Supreme Court considered the
responsibility of a bank examiner under a statute virtually
identical to §7-1-8 U.C.A.

In that case, the court stated as

follows:
The difficulty arises in the classification of
the duties of the bank examiner, whether
discretionary or ministerial. To solve this
question, we must refer to §11 689 R.S.Mo. 1919.
This section makes it mandatory that every bank
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be examined at least once a year. Additional
examinations may be made when deemed necessary in
the judgment of the commissioner. The section
further provides: "On every such examination
inquiries shall be made as to the condition and
resources of such corporation or banker, the mode
of conducting and managing its affairs, the actions
of its directors or trustees if a corporation,
the investment of its funds, the safety and prudence
of its management, the security afforded to those
by whom its engagements are held, and whether the
requirements of its charter and the law have been
complied with in the administration of its affairs;
and as to such other matters as the commissioner
may prescribe . . . "
By the provisions of this
section, the commissioner must make at least one
examination each year. This duty is not a discretionary one, but is ministerial; he has no
alternative or choice in the matter. The same
section leaves it to the judgment of the commissioner
to make additional examinations . . .
We are
also of the opinion that the section makes it a
mandatory duty of the officer who conducts the
examination, to inquire into the various matters
set out in the statute. Since it is mandatory,
it becomes a ministerial duty, the examiner must
make the inquiry with reference to the various
matters set forth in the statute.
A hapnazard examination by an examiner into
tne matters required by the statute is not
sufficient. Where a statute requires an act to
be done, it must be performed with reasonable
degree of diligence, care and prudence. Failure
to so perform that duty is in the law of negligence.
Id.., at 598 (emphasis added).
In determining that the acts of a bank examiner in
performing an annual statutorily required examination were
ministerial and not discretionary, the Missouri Supreme Court
examined the terms of the statute which is virtually identical
to §7-1-8 Utah Code Ann.

Rather than following the Funk v. Turner

cited above, the respondents, in their brief, would have this
court follow Gormley v. State, 54 Ga. App. 843, 189 S.E. 288
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(1936), which the respondents claim to be squarely on point.
The Gormley case has a fact situation which is nearly identical
to the case at bar in that the superintendent of banks failed to
examine an institution because, in his opinion, it was not a
bank and therefore not subject to his supervision.

The plaintiff

in that case lost her savings when it was discovered that the
institution was insolvent and sued the superintendent for negligence
in failing to examine the institution.

In Gormley, the court

decided that based on Georgia statutes, the banking commissioner
was involved in a discretionary function in determining which
corporations in the State of Georgia came within his jurisdiction
as banking commissioner.

Although factually this case appears

to be on all fours with the case at bar, the Georgia statutes
are quite different from the statutory scheme of the State of
Utah.

As pointed out in the case of Vickers v. Motte, 109

Ga. App. 615, 137 S.E. 2d 77 (1964), the Georgia statutory scheme
provided that the superintendent of banks was to annually make
up a list of all banks subject to his jurisdiction.

In another

section of the same act, the term bank was defined as:
Any monied corporation authorized to do named
acts, which shall include incorporated banks,
savings banks, banking companies, trust companies
and other corporations doing a banking business
and expressly excluding building and loan
associations or other associations or corporations.
Id., at 80.

The banking commissioner of the State of Georgia

therefore had different duties than those of the commissioner of
financial institutions in Utah.

The Georgia banking commissioner

was to make up anually a list of those banks which he felt came
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within his jurisdiction.

Also, the Georgia statutes, in defining

those businesses under the jurisdiction of the banking supervisor,
allowed some exceptions.

Therefore, the Georgia banking

superintendent had to exercise his judgment in determining whether
an institution was a bank or fell within the exception.

To the

contrary, §7-3-3 of the Utah Code is clear and specific in its
application and has no statutory exceptions.

Clearly, what

Gormley establishes is that whether a duty of a public official
is mandatory or discretionary depends upon the language of the
statutes imposing the duty upon the public official.

Appellants

submit that the case of Funk v. Turner which interprets a nearly
identical statute to that of the State of Utah should carry more
weight than Gormley v. State which interprets an entirely different
statutory scheme.
B.
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS WAS NOT STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED TO VIOLATE THE LAW.
Further, the appellants claim that the governmental
agency did not possess the requisite statutory authority to make
the challenged omission.
to violate state law.

A state employee has no "discretion"

Its dictates upon the state employee are,

absolute and imperative.

When a court passes judgment on whether

a state employee has complied with state law, it does not seek
to second guess the reasonableness of the employee's decision
nor interfere with the coordinate branch of government's resolution
of competing policy considerations.

Rather, it looks only to

whether the state employee has conformed to the requirements of
the state statutes.

This same result was reached in Owen v. City
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of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1979), which held that a
city was not immune from suit under the discretionary function
exception where the city had violated Federal statutes and the
U.S. Constitution.
To hold that the respondents in this case are shielded
by the discretionary exception to the waiver of governmental
immunity would be to hold that a state employee has the "discretion"
to violate state law.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT EXPAND THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY.
The respondents, in their brief, seek to have the
court expand the principle of governmental immunity to cover all
regulatory activities of state government.

On page 15 of their

brief, respondents cite United States v. Varig Airlines, 467
U.S.

, 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984), for the proposition that:
Whatever else the discretionary function exception
may include, it plainly was intended to encompass
the discretionary acts of the government in acting
in its role as a regulator of the conduct of
private individuals. Time and again the legislative
history refers to the acts of regulatory agencies
as examples of those covered by the exception . . .
Respondents have reviewed all of the cases rendered by

this court concerning the discretionary exception to the waiver
of governmental immunity and this court has never extended the
discretionary function to encompass all regulatory functions of
state government.

In support of this position, the respondents

cite Dalehite v. United States, 364 U.S. 15 (1953), which held
that the United States was immune from suit on a decision to
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implement a fertilizer export program notwithstanding its failure
to determine the fertilizer's explosive capability.

In that

case, the court stated that the "discretionary function":
Includes more than the initiation of programs and
activities. It also includes the determinations
made by executives or administrators in establishing
plans, specifications or schedules of operations.
Note how the Dalehite decision runs exactly contrary
to the decision of this court in Andress v. State, 541 P.2d 117
(Utah 1975), where this court determined that:

The decision to build the highway and specifying
its general location were discretionary functions,
but the preparing of plans and specifications and
the supervision of the manner in which the work
was carried out cannot be labeled as discretionary
functions. (Id., at 1120)
Rather than following the lead of the Dalehite case, this court
has consistently drawn the line between those functions ascribable
to the policy making level and those ascribable to the operational
level.

(Little v. State Division of Family Services, supra.)
The United States Supreme Court, in a footnote to its

opinion in Owen v. City of Independence, supra., noted that:
In this country, the sovereign or governmental
immunity doctrine holding that the state, its
subdivisions and municipal entities may not be
held liable for tortious acts, was never completely
accepted by the courts, its underlying principle
being deemed contrary to the basic concept of the
law of torts that liability follows negligence,
as well as foreign to the spirit of the constitutional guarantee that every person is entitled to
a legal remedy for injuries he may receive in his
person or property. As a result, the trend of
judicial decisions was always to restrict rather

-11-

than to expand the doctrine of the municipal
immunity. (Note on pp. 645/ 646)
The appellants submit that the analysis of the
U.S. Supreme Court is correct; the concept of government immunity
is contrary to basic principles upon which our society is founded,
i.e., that liability follows negligence and that every person is
entitled to a legal remedy for injuries to his person or property.
It would be improper for this court to expand the concept of
governmental immunity as the respondents argue to include all
regulatory activities of the government whether or not such
regulatory activities occur at the basic policy making level or
at the operational level.
POINT IV
HOLDING THE STATE LIABLE FOR ITS NEGLIGENCE AND THAT
OF ITS AGENTS WILL NOT MAKE THE STATE AN INSURER OF ALL DEPOSITS
IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE STATE.
In Respondent's Brief, respondents repeatedly warn the
court that to hold the state liable for its negligence in this
case would inevitably lead to the state becoming "an insurer or
guarantor for every dollar invested in every financial
institution."

(Respondent's Brief, p. 26)

This argument assumes,

of course, that the state department of financial institutions
is acting with such negligence in its regulation of the financial
institutions of this state that in every case where a depositer
loses his money, he will be able to establish that the state had
a duty—that the duty was breached and that the breach was the
proximate cause of his injury.
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If the state is indeed acting with such negligence,
perhaps it ought to be held liable for every dollar lost by a
depositor.

If the state is not acting with such negligence,

then the respondents' argument is meaningless.
Both the states of Arizona, in State v. Superior Court
of Maricopa County, 123 Ariz. 324, 599 P.2d 777 (1979), and
Illinois, in Teherepnin v. Franz, 570 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1978),
have allowed depositers in financial institutions to sue the
state for its negligent inspection of those financial institutions.
Since all the elements of negligence must be established, neither
state has become an insurer or guarantor for every dollar invested
in every financial institution nor has either state been forced
into bankruptcy.
POINT V
THE FEDERAL CASES CITED BY RESPONDENTS, IN THEIR BRIEF,
DO NOT SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SHOULD BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN THE CASE
AT BAR.
In Respondent's Brief, after noting that Utah's Governmental Immunity Act was patterned after the Federal Tort Claims
Act and noting that "this court has consistently applied a
substantially identical standard as federal cases construing
that act, and determining the meaning of 'discretionary function,1"
the respondents claim that the "federal cases in which issue has
arisen have unanimously held that regulation of financial
institutions is a discretionary function under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, for which regulatory agencies are immune from suit."
(Respondents' Brief, pp. 10-11)

A close examination of the
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federal cases cited by respondents in their brief, clearly show
that the cases cited do not deal with the issues set forth in
the case at bar and do not support the respondents' position.
In Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1980), the
Seventh Circuit Court, rather than applying a blanket conclusion
that the government is immune from all suits concerning the
regulation of financial institutions, specifically considered
the distinction between policy and planning as opposed to the
operational level.

In this regard, the court stated as follows:

This policy or planning as opposed to the operational
level distinction has served as the primary test
for applicability of §2680(a) since Dalehite. . .
The existence of a discretionary function, and
thus the potential for governmental liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act ultimately
rests upon the characterization of the challenged
behavior as "policy" or "operations."
Further, the court in Emch specifically recognized
that there may be times when federal agencies charged with the
regulation of banking institutions would be liable for losses of
the financial institutions if the negligence occurred at the
operational level on the part of the federal agencies.

In

re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation, 445 F. Supp. 723
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) stands as an example of federal agencies acting
on the operational level in regulating financial institutions
and therefore being liable for their negligence.

It should be

further noted that the issue in Emch was not a failure to examine
as in the case at bar, but rather a complaint against the government
for committing numerous mistakes, errors and omissions in the
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course of the bank examination.

Such is clearly not the issue

in the case at bar.
In First Savings and Loan Association v. First Federal
Savings and Loan Association, 531 F. Supp. 251 (1961), cited by
the respondents in their brief on pages 13 and 34, an action was
brought by First Savings and Loan Association alleging that
First Federal Savings and Loan Association had acted in concert
with the government to place First Savings and Loan Association
in receivorship and sell its assets.

This was a claim for an

intentional tort and is not in any way similar in the case at
bar.
In First Savings and Loan Association v. First Federal
Savings and Loan Association of Hawaii, 542 F. Supp. 988 (1982),
the plaintiffs' claim was dismissed due to the failure of the
plaintiffs to file a claim with a federal agency within two
years from the time the claim first accrued.

Again, this action

cited by the respondents on page 13 of their brief has no relevance
to any of the issues before the court in the case at bar.
In Magellsen v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 341
F. Supp. 1031 (1972), cited by respondents on page 13 of their
brief, an action was brought against the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp. for failure to act upon an application for insurance and
for discrimination against the individual who had submitted the
application.

This case also bears no similarity to any of the

issues presented in the case at bar.
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In Davis v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 369 F. Supp
277 (1974), an action was brought against the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. for the failure to disclose to the public the
insolvency of a particular bank.

In that case, the court held

that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. had no duty to disclose
the insolvency to the general public.

Davis would be relevant

to the case at bar if the appellants, as claimed by the respondents
on page 33 of their brief, were making a claim against the
Department of Financial Institutions for failing to disclose the
insolvency of the bank.

In making this claim, the respondents

are merely setting up a straw man so that they can knock it down
again.

The appellants have made it clear in their pleadings and

in the record that they make no such claim.
666)

(R., at 665 and

Rather, the point being made by the appellants is that,

after issuing the cease and desist order prohibiting Grove Finance
from accepting additional monies on deposit, the defendants
totally failed to enforce such order to the damage and detriment
of the appellants.
In

Huntington Towers Ltd. v. Franklin National Bank,

559 F.2d 863 (1977), rather than merely adopting the position
urged by respondent in this case that all government regulation
of banking institutions is per se a discretionary activity, the
court in Huntington Towers did exactly what the appellants in
this case are asking this court to do; i.e., it reviewed the
language of the statute to determine if the act complained of
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was discretionary or ministerial.

In the Huntington Towers

case, the complaints against the comptroller were as follows:
(1) He failed to declare an insolvent bank
solvent;
(2) He declared an insolvent bank solvent;
(3) He kept an insolvent bank;
(4) He consented to an unlawful preference
among creditors in violation of 12 U.S.C. §194; and
(5) He failed he failed to take action to
have those preferred liens declared null and avoid.
Again, this case raises none of the issues presented
to this court in the case at bar.
Finally, in Dannhausen v. First National Bank of Sturgeon
Bay, 538 F. Supp. 551 (1982), the opinion of the court does
contain dicta that 28 U.S.C. §2680(a) precludes suits againt the
United States involved in the regulation and examination of
banks.

Although this language appears in dicta, again the issues

in the Dannhausen case are not even vaguely similar to the issues
set forth in the case at bar.

In Dannhausen, the issue was

whether the comptroller could be held liable for his refusal to
give information to the plaintiffs concerning the results of a
bank examination.
A close examination of the federal cases, which
respondents claim unanimously hold that the governmental regulation
of financial institutions is per se discretionary, fails to
support the respondents' point.

None of the cases deal directly

with the issues presented to the court in the case at bar.
Further, the Emch case primarily relied upon by the respondents
specifically distinguishes between those acts performed at the
policy making level and those made at the operational level.
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POINT VI
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO A TRIAL TO DETERMINE
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE.
Respondents, in their brief, stated that "the respondents
agree with some of the facts set forth in the appellants1 statement
of facts, but controvert others . . . "
2)

(Respondents' Brief, p.

The respondents then went on to set forth their version of

the facts, many of which the appellants strenuously disagree with.
For example, on page 43 of the Appellants' Brief,
appellants stated "The record now before the court attests that
Grove Finance complied with all reporting requirements both as a
small loan business and as a supervised lender, and that
examinations by the Department of Financial Institutions indicated
no U.C.C.C. violations, prior to the issuance of the cease and
desist order in 1980."

Nothing could be further from the truth.

Rather, the appellants, in their motion for summary judgment,
demonstrated to the court numerous violations of the U.C.C.C.
reporting requirements by Grove Finance Company which the Department
of Financial Institutions either knew or should have known of.
(R. 953, 954, 955)
In a case such as this where the facts are disputed,
it is appropriate for the appellants to be allowed a trial so
that the facts can be determined by the court.

Such a deter-

mination of the facts, however, is not necessary for this court
to determine whether the respondents are immune from suit under
the principles of governmental immunity.

Rather, this court

should consider the complaints of the plaintiffs-appellants and
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the allegations contained therein should be taken as true in
determining whether the state is immune from suit pursuant to
the principles of governmental immunity,
CONCLUSION
An examination of the rationale underlying the common
law immunity for "discretionary functions" demonstrates that
this exception to the waiver of governmental immunity is based
upon the doctrine of separation of powers rather than the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.

For this reason, the discretionary function

exception to the waiver of governmental immunity should be confined
strictly to those decisions and acts occurring at the basic
policy making level and not extended to those acts and decisions
taking place at the operational level.

This court has followed

the federal courts in making the distinction between the basic
policy making level and the operational level.

However, to hold

that the respondents in this case are shielded by the discretionary
exception to the waiver of governmental immunity would be to
hold that a state employee has the "discretion" to violate the law.
This court has been asked by the respondents to extend
the doctrine of governmental immunity to cover all cases where
the government is performing a regulatory function whether or
not it is performing on the basic policy making level or on the
operational level.

Since the concept of governmental immunity

goes directly contrary to the well-established principles that
liability follows negligence and the constitutional guarantee
that every person is entitled to a legal remedy for injuries he
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may receive in his person or property, this court should decline
to extend the doctrine of governmental immunity as requested by
the respondents.
The appellants respectfully request that the court
overrule the decision of the Third District Court holding the
respondents immune from suit and allow this matter to proceed
forward to trial.
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of January, 1985.
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